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Abstract 
Social media has become an important part of the 
lives of their hundreds of millions of users. Hackers 
make use of the large target audience by sending 
malicious content, often by hijacking existing accounts. 
This phenomenon has caused widespread research on 
how to detect hacked accounts, where different 
approaches exist. This work sets out to analyze the 
possibilities of including the reactions of hacked Twitter 
accounts’ peers into a detection system. Based on a 
dataset of six million tweets crawled from Twitter over 
the course of two years, we select a subset of tweets in 
which users react to alleged hacks of other accounts. We 
then gather and analyze the responses to those messages 
to reconstruct the conversations made. A quantitative 
analysis of these conversations shows that 30% of the 
users that are allegedly being hacked reply to the 
accusations, suggesting that these users acknowledge 
that their account was hacked. 
 
1. Introduction  
Twitter is a popular microblogging service that 
allows users to write short messages, called tweets, 
which may not exceed a length of 140 characters. The 
last official numbers from May 2015 state that 
approximately 500 million tweets were sent every day 
and consumed by a total of 310 million active users [1].  
Twitter’s popularity in terms of the number of tweets 
sent and the number of users active on the platform 
every day makes it an interesting target for cyber-
criminals. In principle, cybercriminals aim to hack 
Twitter accounts to spread spam which contain URLS 
leading to e.g., phishing websites over these accounts 
[2], [3]. On the Twitter platform, tweets appear on the 
timeline of all followers of a particular user. Therefore, 
cybercriminals aim at hacking accounts with an already 
established social network (i.e., accounts with a 
substantial number of followers) which allows for 
directly delivering spam messages to a multitude of 
users. More importantly, in online social networks such 
as Twitter, a notion of trust is created between users and 
their followers—regardless of whether users actually 
know each other in real life or not [4]. This trust among 
users is exploited by cybercriminals as people are more 
likely to click on links sent by trusted peers [5], which 
naturally is a desirable property for hackers to exploit. 
Therefore, cybercriminals are more likely to hack into 
accounts with an existing social network than creating 
own accounts, which are also more prone to be detected 
earlier [2], [6].  
Heymann et al. find that there are three different 
types of countermeasures that may be used to cope with 
spam in social networks: (i) detection, (ii) demotion and 
(iii) prevention [7]. During the last years, Twitter has 
developed mechanisms for detecting accounts which are 
used for spreading spam [2]. Thomas et al. found that 
these mechanisms allow for detecting 77% of all Twitter 
accounts which are used to spread spam within the first 
day of having started to send out malicious contents and 
92% of all accounts are detected (and subsequently 
suspended) within three days [8], [9]. Approaches for 
detecting spam, spamming accounts and hence, 
compromised accounts include information about the 
content of the messages themselves as well as other 
meta-information, such as the amount of follower 
relationships a user has [10]–[13]. 
Zangerle et al. performed an analysis of the reactions 
of Twitter users once they found that their account has 
been hacked [14]. They find that 27% of those users 
change to a new account and 51% of those users send 
out a tweet stating that their account was hacked and 
apologize for any unsolicited tweets. However, little 
research is done on the reactions of the peers of 
allegedly hacked users who might even point those users 
to their hacked accounts (if the hacked user does not 
recognize that the account has been compromised and 
used for sending spam). We hypothesize that peers that 
use Twitter may be faster in detecting a hack by reading 
the posted (possible malicious) content. Therefore, we 
are interested in analyzing Twitter conversations 
revealing that users might be pointed to a compromised 
account by peers. Particularly, we aim to reliably 
reconstruct conversations on Twitter, where users point 
other users to the fact that their account might have been 
hacked (e.g., “@AllRiseSilver is your twitter account 
hacked?”) to analyze the behavior of the Twitter users 
taking part in these conversations. Subsequently, we 
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analyze these tweets to study to which extent such 
conversations might be suited to extract hints about 
hacked Twitter accounts and to perform a detailed 
analysis on how users behave in these conversations.  
From a dataset of six million tweets collected over 
the course of two years, we extract a subset of tweets 
that suggest that peers point each other to the fact that 
the other’s account has been hacked and also 
incorporate the reaction of the hacked user to these 
suggestions. We realize these analyses by using a 
supervised machine learning method. The responses of 
these alleged victims are then crawled and classified. 
Using this method, we show that 30% of the accused 
victims respond to the accusations, either confirming a 
hack or explaining the situation. We also find that 48% 
of all users that actually reply to these allegations, 
respond within the first hour after having received a 
tweet suggesting that their account might have been 
hacked. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
In Section 2, we first explain some background of 
Twitter and the problem of hacked accounts, including 
related work on this topic. Section 3 presents the dataset 
underlying the performed analyses. Section 4 presents 
the methods utilized for the analyses and Section 5 
presents the results. Section 6 presents a discussion of 
the results and Section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. Related Work 
Wherever social communication is able to gather a 
large audience, misuse of the services is interesting for 
hackers. The scenarios of misusing Twitter include 
impersonation [15], the creation of fake accounts (so-
called “sybils”) [16], phishing [17], malware 
distribution [18] or spamming campaigns [19]. Thomas 
et al. [8] lay out that URLs that are posted on Twitter 
have a significantly higher likelihood of being followed 
than URIs in email spam, especially if the user account 
posting the link is trustworthy (e.g. in a follower 
relationship). They also emphasize that hackers favor 
taking control over existing accounts over creating 
dedicated spamming accounts, as this increases the trust 
between the hacker and the victim as well as creates new 
possible attack points, such as direct messages, which 
are difficult to analyze because they cannot be crawled 
using the public APIs. This finding is also confirmed by 
Kanich et al. [20]. However, it is more difficult to obtain 
information about direct messages since only the 
sending and receiving users have access to their content. 
Generally, the detection of hacked accounts has been 
tackled from different perspectives. Methods used 
include many different aspects, using the content of the 
messages sent, geographical and timely information as 
well as the social connections on Twitter. Mostly, 
approaches for detecting spam relies on a multitude of 
features, including content features as similarity of 
tweet texts, social network information such as number 
of followers, and behavioral features such as the retweet 
ration [10], [12], [13], [21]–[23]. Lee et al. create social 
honeypots to analyze the behavior of cybercriminals. 
Based on the information collected, they propose a spam 
identification method [11], [13]. Also, social features of 
spamming accounts, the social network of 
cybercriminals have been studied [24], [25].  
Twitter already has profound methods for detecting 
and disabling suspicious user accounts, but no details on 
its implementation are publicly available. The user 
guidelines merely point out several aspects that a user 
should note to avoid account suspension [9]. 
Furthermore, Twitter provides means to report 
spamming user accounts or to report individual spam 
tweets [26], [27]. Thomas et al. evaluated the 
effectiveness of Twitter’s spam detection methods in 
2011 and found that 77% of all spam accounts are 
detected within the first 24 hours and 92% of all 
spamming accounts are detected and suspended within 
three days [8]. 
Zangerle et al. [14] provide an analysis on how users 
whose account was compromised react publicly on 
Twitter. They found that 27% of the users change to a 
new account, whereas 51% of hacked users apologize 
for unsolicited messages and spam. However, the 
analyses at hand does not focus on the user whose 
account has been compromised, we rather focus on 
conversations with peers of this particular user. To the 
best of our knowledge, no other approaches so far focus 
on the peers of hacked users.  
3. Dataset 
In the following section, we describe the crawling 
methods utilized for the collection of the dataset 
underlying the analyses at hand. Subsequently, we 
present the main characteristics of the resulting dataset.  
In principle, we require a dataset containing tweets 
about hacked accounts for the analyses to be performed. 
Therefore, we make use of the public Twitter Streaming 
API to gather such tweets. The Streaming API provides 
means for gathering tweets featuring given filter 
keywords and metadata associated with the individual 
tweets as JSON-objects [28]. As for the filter keywords 
used, we restrain the set of crawled tweets to those 
which contain both the keywords “account” and 
“hacked” as this method has already been applied by 
Zangerle et al. for a similar task [14]. Twitter restricts 
the number of tweets which can be crawled freely over 
its APIs to approximately 1% of all tweets being sent. 
Therefore, the number of tweets delivered is capped by 
a rate limit [29]. However, inspecting the number of 
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tweets crawled per day shows that the daily number of 
tweets is constantly well below this 1% mark and hence, 
this fact suggests that no tweets matching our filter 
criterion have been capped, ensuring a full coverage of 
tweets according to the specified filter criterion. 
Applying the described crawling method, we were 
able to collect a total of 4.7 million tweets between 
November 2012 and October 2014. Table 1 depicts the 
main characteristics of the dataset. For all tweets 
gathered over the API, Twitter does not only provide the 
tweet itself, but also—in case of retweets—the original 
tweet which was retweeted. As we consider these 
original tweets valuable for the analyses as well, we 
extract these and add these to the dataset, which results 
in a total of 5,984,406 tweets. As can be seen from 
Table 1, 31.82% (1,495,325) of all tweets are retweets 
and 54.83% (3,281,005) feature at least one mention of 
another Twitter user. 
 
Table 1: Dataset characteristics. 
Characteristic Amount 
Tweets 4,698,845 
Tweets incl. extracted retweets 5,984,406 
Distinct authors 2,670,318 
Retweets 1,495,325 
Tweets containing mentions 3,281,005 
Distinct Hashtags 120,690 
Distinct URLs 216,318 
 
The extraction of retweeted tweets from the data 
provided by the API revealed that those tweet texts may 
have been shortened during the process of retweeting 
due to Twitter’s 140 character limitation for tweets. This 
behavior is showcased in the following example tweet: 
“RT @wayfaringcalum: @Calum5SOS hi cal,I hope 
youre having fun in America!! If you happen to see this 
pretty please refollow me,someone hack…”. As can be 
seen, the tweet no longer contains the word “hacked” as 
it was cut off the text of the original tweet due to the 
need to adhere to the 140 character limit. To still be able 
to also incorporate the full content of such tweets in our 
study, we have to fetch the full text of the original tweet 
in order to be able to reconstruct the cut off tweet 
content. Therefore, we extract the retweeted message’s 
full content from the JSON-object of the retweeting 
tweet and add these to the dataset as well. 
Based on this dataset, we firstly perform a 
prefiltering step before being able to perform the actual 
analyses. The required prefiltering steps and analysis 
methods utilized are described in the following section. 
4. Methods 
In the following section, we present the methods 
utilized for performing the analyses proposed.  
In principle, we require a set of messages that 
suggest that a Twitter account might have been hacked 
to firstly be able to reconstruct conversations about 
hacked accounts and to subsequently classify the hacked 
users’ responses. Therefore, the messages have to 
contain a mention tag of a user and an indication that the 
affected account is hijacked to be included in the 
analyses.  
Starting from the dataset of crawled tweets, we 
perform the following analysis steps, which are depicted 
in Figure 1: (1) Clean the dataset by removing all 
messages that do not contain any mention. (2) Extract a 
subset of messages that actually suggest another Twitter 
account being hacked. (3) Remove the messages that 
mention users that are no longer active on Twitter. (4) 
Fetch tweets of the users that were mentioned directly 
following the tweet in which the users and the alleged 
hack were mentioned. (5) Classify the responses. In 
Figure 1, blue wavy blocks represent sets of tweets, the 
green rectangles labeled “ML” stand for the machine 
learning processes that are performed. The red boxes 
denote services provided by Twitter that we utilize over 
the according API. These five steps are explained in 
detail in the following section. 
As each of the first three steps aims to narrow down 
the available data to a dataset only containing relevant 
messages required for the actual analyses, Table 2 
shows the amount of messages left after having 
performed each of the steps. We list which filtering step 
is performed, followed by the amount of messages that 
were left afterwards. Also, we list the number of actually 
fetched timelines based on the information gathered 
during prefiltering steps 1-3. 
 
 
Figure 1: Workflow overview 
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Table 2: Sizes of intermediate message sets 
Step Message set  Amount 
- All 5,984,406 
1 Mention 2,266,935 
2 Positive 444,315 
3 Existing 412,228 
4 Fetched timelines 54,835 
4.1. Removing tweets without mentions 
As we require information about users who are 
mentioned within the tweets contained in our dataset to 
be able to reconstruct conversations about hacked 
accounts, the first step is to filter the dataset for all 
tweets which actually mention other users. A substantial 
amount of tweets within the dataset do not contain any 
mentions (e.g., when users state that their own account 
was hacked: “Looks like my twitter account got hacked. 
I didn’t lose 2.5lbs“).  
The JSON file gathered over the Twitter API 
contains a separate field for any mention information in 
a tweet. This allows to extract information about the 
mentioned user account without having to parse the 
tweet text. We utilize this information to extract all 
tweets that actually contain a mention of another user to 
further be processed in the next step. Table 2 shows that 
out of the total 5,984,406 messages, 2,266,935 tweets 
(37.88%) are left to process in the next step. 
4.2. Extracting tweets suggesting hacks 
The word “hacked” can describe a variety of 
different scenarios, but for the performed analyses only 
suggestions of another Twitter account being hacked are 
relevant (e.g., “@AllRiseSilver is your twitter account 
hacked?”). We eliminate different other cases such as 
the mention of a different kind of account being hacked 
(e.g., “@AmpersUK Looks like you Gmail account 
hasbeen hacked”) by using supervised machine 
learning. Along the lines of Zangerle et al. [14] and also 
following research trends [16], we use a Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) [30] classifier with a linear kernel. 
Also, we utilize a Term-Frequency vs. Inverse 
Document Frequency (TF-IDF) [31] vectorizer to 
compute the feature vectors representing each message. 
The parameters of the classifier and vectorizer are 
determined using a grid search approach [32], which 
internally uses 5-fold cross validation. Table 3 shows 
the parameters that performed best for the SVM and the 
TF-IDF vectorizer when the grid search was optimized 
for the f1-score. We make use of the free python library 
scikit-learn [33] for all machine learning processes. As 
for linguistic features of the tweet texts being analyzed, 
we follow previous research [34], [35] and performed 
lemmatization [36] (i.e., we map all words to their basic 
word form).  
 
Table 3: Best parameters for SVM and TF-IDF 
vectorizer 
SVM parameter Best value 
C 1.0 
TF-IDF parameter Best value 
n-gram size (1, 3) 
Max. document frequency 0.9 
Min. document frequency 0.0001 
 
Figure 2 depicts the workflow of the machine learning 
process. First, a subset of messages is manually 
classified (1). A TF-IDF vectorizer calculates the 
feature vectors (2). Our workflow includes a chi-square-
test (3), which filters the feature vectors to leave the 
most significant ones. However, the overall 
performance is best if all features are used. The SVM is 
then trained based on the feature vectors (4) and 
subsequently predicts the classes of the remaining 
unclassified tweets (5). In Figure 2, the blue wavy boxes 
represent sets of messages. The green rectangles denote 
machine learning methods we utilize as provided by the 
scikit-learn toolkit [33]. Intermediate feature 
representations are displayed by yellow rhombs. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Machine learning process 
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Table 4: Confusion matrix 
 Predicted positive Predicted negative 
Is positive True positive (TP) False positive (FP) 
Is negative False negative (FN) True negative (TN) 
  
To evaluate the performance of the classification, 
different methods can be used. Table 4 shows the 
confusion matrix of classification and depicts all 
possible combinations of a sample being classified. 
Based on this confusion matrix, traditional IR quality 
measures like precision and recall [36] may be defined. 
Precision is defined as 𝑝𝑟 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
 and describes how 
many of the predicted samples are actually relevant. 
Recall is defined as 𝑟𝑒𝑐 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
 and describes how 
many of the available relevant samples were classified 
as such. It can be seen that the two values on their own 
are not meaningful for our use-case, as they are easy to 
optimize. A classifier that predicts all samples as 
relevant has a perfect recall of 1.0, whereas a classifier 
that randomly guesses one positive sample as such and 
ignores all other has a precision of 1.0. Therefore, we 
require a combination of those two measures to evaluate 
the performance of the classifier and propose to utilize 
PR-curves as well as the f1-score as described in the 
following. The precision vs. recall curve (PR-curve) is a 
quality measure that visualizes how the precision and 
recall values change with varying discrimination 
thresholds of the classifier. The f1-score is the harmonic 
mean of precision and recall and is calculated as 𝑓1 =
2 ⋅
𝑝𝑟⋅𝑟𝑒𝑐
𝑝𝑟+𝑟𝑒𝑐
.  
A classifier usually performs best if it is trained with 
the same amount of samples for each class [37], [38]. 
The training set consists of 3,650 manually classified 
messages that were randomly chosen from the data set, 
out of which 455 are labelled as relevant. To cope with 
the imbalance of classes, there are a number of 
approaches:  
 Sampling: by removing overrepresented samples 
(undersampling) or duplicating existing 
underrepresented samples (oversampling), a 
balance in the class sizes can be achieved. In 
contrast to other sophisticated, domain-aware 
oversampling approaches like SMOTE [39], we 
used a blind copying approach where existing 
samples are randomly duplicated. Research on 
whether under- or oversampling yields better 
results are inconclusive [37], therefore we 
evaluated both of these methods.  
 Automatic class weighting: we use the built-in 
weighting function of scikit-learn, which 
incorporates weights inversely proportional to the 
class frequencies into the classification 
process [40]. 
 
Figure 3 shows the precision vs. recall curve for the 
performed classification step. The f1-values for the four 
evaluated classification methods dealing with class 
imbalance (undersampling, oversampling, class 
weighting, no countermeasures taken) obtained by a 5-
fold cross validation are listed in Table 5. As can be 
seen, none of the analyzed methods outperforms the 
plain imbalance-unaware classification. Therefore, we 
utilize the imbalance-unaware classification for step 2 
of our analysis workflow.  
 
Figure 3: Precision vs. recall of imbalance 
countermeasures 
Table 5: F1-scores of class imbalance 
countermeasures (step 2) 
Method F1-score 
Plain 0.73 
Undersample 0.72 
Oversample 0.70 
Class weighting 0.67 
 
In the performed classification step, 444,315 
messages were classified as relevant, which amounts to 
19.6% of the tweets remaining resulting from step 1.  
4.3. Removing inactive users 
The next step in the analysis workflow aims to 
remove inactive users from the dataset to speed up the 
subsequent fetching step. The bottleneck of the analysis 
workflow in regards to computing time is the rate 
limitation of the Twitter API for step 4, which only 
allows fetching 200 messages at a time, with an 
additional limit of 180 requests per 15-minute time 
slot [41]. Therefore, we aim to keep the number of API-
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calls to be made for the analysis as low as possible by 
removing inactive users from the dataset (and hence, 
from future API calls). Twitter offers an additional API 
endpoint to fetch users, which allows to check the status 
of 200 users per request. If a username is not returned 
by the API, that user account is either inactive (e.g., 
Twitter suspended the account due to sending spam) or 
deliberately deleted by the user. Using this method, 
inactive users are removed and the remaining set of step 
2 is narrowed down to 412,228 tweets, implying that 
7.2% of the tweets within the dataset were composed by 
users who were no longer active or banned from the 
Twitter platform (32,987 of 444,315 tweets) and hence, 
removed from the dataset.  
4.4. Fetching responses 
In the next step, we aim to actually fetch responses 
to tweets which allegedly report a hacked account (as 
extracted by the previously performed steps). As 
described in Section 2, Twitter offers a dedicated field 
for storing the original message if a user replies to a 
tweet. An obvious way to fetch responses is to use the 
search API to fetch messages that directly reply to 
tweets assuming a hack. However, general responses 
that address multiple users often do not use mentions at 
all, (e.g., “sorry for any recently sent spam messages - 
my twitter account was hacked…”). To be able to 
include those responses as well, we fetch all messages 
that were sent by the mentioned user account directly 
after the mentioning tweet was published on the Twitter 
platform. 
Twitter’s timeline API endpoint allows to fetch a 
maximum of 200 message per request [42]. To specify 
the time of the desired messages in a request, two fields 
since_id and max_id can be provided, which act as a 
lower and upper bound for tweet ids. Figure 4 depicts 
the upper and lower bounds of the timeline API. As 
lower bound, the mentioning tweet can be used. 
However, due to the tweets being sent some time in the 
past, the correct upper bound (i.e., the length of the 
timespan to be crawled) is not known in advance. The 
only way to ensure all relevant messages are fetched is 
to choose the upper bound in the present, which causes 
Twitter to return the latest 200 messages as a response. 
After receiving this batch, one can set the max_id to the 
earliest received message and continue in this manner 
until the timespan of interest is covered. 
In addition to a 180 requests per 15-minute timeslot 
limitation, Twitter only allows users to fetch the latest 
3,200 messages from another user’s timeline, meaning 
that fetching possible responses that were sent too long 
in the past is not feasible.  
 
Figure 4: Fetching timelines 
To prevent fetching unnecessary messages only to 
discover that the timespan of interest is not available, a 
preliminary batch can be requested, with the max_id 
parameter set to the id of the mention. The since_id just 
has to be set early enough in the past to ensure the 
preliminary batch to return anything, so it is set to zero. 
If this request returns any messages, the timespan of 
interest is guaranteed to be available for crawling. 
Figure 5 shows the schema of this preliminary batch.  
When the preliminary batch does not return any 
results for a user, that user is ignored for all further 
processing as no information of the desired timespan 
can be gathered. Otherwise, we fetch the responses until 
reaching the timespan of interest and beyond.  
Out of the 412,228 messages that mention users 
allegedly being hacked, the timelines and hence, 
responses of 54,835 users have been fetched from 
Twitter, where a response represents the overall set of 
messages that user sent after the mention incident. The 
presented method allows for fetching a total of 54,835 
timelines which represent the input for the subsequent 
classification step. 
 
 
Figure 5: Preliminary batch 
4.5. Classifying responses 
The last step of the analysis workflow is dedicated 
to the actual classification and analysis of the 
conversations gathered. For the manual classification, a 
response in general is considered relevant when at least 
one message in the 30 messages following the mention 
are answering suggestions, either directly (e.g., 
“@howly Thanks! I will look into it!”) or indirectly 
(e.g., “You can stop writing me, I know I was hacked”). 
Further analysis of the predicted data shows that 95% of 
the responses occurred within the first 10 messages that 
the accused user wrote after the mention. Hence, we 
argue that analyzing a total of 30 messages following 
the mention delivers a sufficiently large time window 
for the analysis. 
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The classification of the responses is done in the 
same way as in step 2, using a linear SVM and a TF-IDF 
vectorizer. However, the class imbalance is more 
substantial than in the first classification step: of 41,569 
randomly chosen and manually classified messages, 617 
were selected as relevant. The same methods as in step 
2 were applied to cope with the imbalance. Table 6 
shows the f1-scores for the tested methods. The 
undersampling method outperforms the others by a 
small margin, therefore we chose to use undersampling 
for the final prediction step.  
In an additional experiment, we also performed 
evaluations regarding linguistic features of the tweets. 
Therefore, we removed stopwords, hashtags, mentions 
or URLs (and any subset of these features) from the 
tweet text before computing the TDF/IDF vectors. 
However, none of the approaches evaluated led to a 
substantial increase of the classification performance in 
regards to F1-scores of the SVM as can be seen from 
Table 7. Hence, we did not include any of these 
measures in the final classification step performed.  
 
Table 6: F1-scores of class imbalance 
countermeasures (step 5) 
Method F1-score 
Plain 0.77 
Undersampling 0.73 
Oversampling 0.78 
Class weighting 0.70 
 
Table 7: F1-scores of hashtag, mention and URL 
removal 
Remove 
hashtags 
Remove 
mentions 
Remove 
URLs 
F1-score 
   0.760 
  ✓ 0.759 
 ✓  0.758 
✓   0.761 
 ✓ ✓ 0.753 
✓  ✓ 0.759 
✓ ✓  0.757 
✓ ✓ ✓ 0.758 
5. Results  
In the following section, we present the results of the 
analyses performed by applying the methods described 
in Section 4 to the dataset presented in Section 3. 
As for reliably reconstructing conversations on 
Twitter up to the point, where a user is pointed to his or 
her compromised account, we observe that by utilizing 
the presented research method, we are able to 
reconstruct conversations of 13.3% of all analyzed 
mentions. From these responses, we find 30.0% (a total 
of 16,452 messages) of the messages being relevant in 
terms of the user replying to the accusing mention. By 
using the text content of the messages rather than relying 
on direct answers, we are able to include loose 
conversations that are not directed to single users but 
address multiple possible mentioning peers (e.g. “sorry 
for any recently sent spam messages – my twitter 
account was hacked…”). Using Twitter-specific input 
sanitizing methods such as removing hashtags, 
mentions or URLs did not show substantial changes in 
regards to the classification quality (f1-score).  
When it comes to the suitability of extracted 
conversations for detecting hacked and compromised 
Twitter accounts, we observe that by analyzing the 
peers’ reactions instead of the allegedly hacked account 
itself, we are able to detect the distribution of spam on 
multiple levels, including direct messages, which are 
impossible to directly analyze due to Twitter’s privacy 
restrictions. This shows that the proposed method may 
also be used to detect malicious behavior on other 
contexts than Twitter itself. 
Regarding the reaction of users once they are pointed 
to the fact that their account might have been hacked, 
we find that 30% of the users that are accused of being 
hacked generally respond. The reactions cover a large 
variety of possible scenarios, including confirmations of 
any suspicions (e.g. "@katiekellypoet thanks for letting 
me know Hun"), but also explanations of the situation 
(e.g. "haha no that was my brother").  
We also analyzed the timespan until users who are 
pointed to the fact that their account might have been 
hacked, react to these allegations. In this analysis, we 
find that 80% of all users within the dataset respond 
within the first 24 hours. More importantly, 48% of the 
replies were sent within the first hour after having 
received the hint that their account might have been 
hacked. When counting the number of tweets that have 
been sent between the time of receiving the hint and the 
actual response tweet, we observe a similar behavior: 
95% of all responses to hints are contained within the 10 
messages sent, where 53% of all users make use of the 
first tweet for replying to the alleged hack of their 
accounts.  
6. Discussion 
In this section, we further discuss the findings 
presented in the previous section. Also, we shed light on 
the limitations of the proposed approach and present 
plans for future work following up the current study. 
Firstly, we find that conversations can be 
reconstructed reliably. However, one limitation to the 
presented analyses is the fact that the base dataset was 
crawled 2014. Due to the fact that Twitter’s API only 
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allows for fetching the last 3,200 messages of any given 
user, part of the conversations could not be 
reconstructed due to the amount of time passed (and 
hence, the number of tweets sent). In total, for 13.3% of 
all users which were filtered to be relevant during the 
preprocessing steps, we are able to reconstruct the 
conversations by fetching the according timelines, 
which certainly poses a limitation. However, we argue 
that using the dataset at hand, this analyses can still be 
regarded as a baseline for such analyses. To be able to 
increase the amount of users that responses can be 
fetched from, a future application could use real-time 
data of users that occur in mentions. This way, the 3,200 
messages limit of Twitter is no longer a problem.  
The complexity of natural languages often prevents 
the reconstruction of a conversation without having 
knowledge about its context. Therefore, a correct 
classification of a message is often impossible for 
humans too. The proposed method reaches f1-scores 
ranging from 0.73 to 0.78. This certainly poses a 
limitation to our approach. However, we argue that even 
in this case, our findings provide a baseline for further 
studies—even if more conversations might be extracted 
given more recent data. To increase the performance of 
the machine learning steps in future work, we aim to 
compare different machine learning methods for the 
given classification problem (kernel-based SVM, naïve 
Bayes or Random Forest). 
Another limitation to the presented approach lies in 
the context of messages. Consider a situation in which a 
user apologizes to a larger audience. Even if the user 
was notified by a peer, there is no guarantee that this 
message caused that user to be aware of the hacked 
account as we are not able to reliably detect what 
actually made the user realize that his/her account has 
been hacked. An in-depth classification and qualitative 
analysis of the responses may give an insight on this 
situation. We plan to carry out such an evaluation in 
future work. 
To get a deeper understanding of possibly different 
types of messages within the dataset, we performed an 
explorative study on the conversations. This analysis 
showed that there are different types of tweets and 
responses as discussed in the following.  
As for the initial tweets (i.e., tweets that describe an 
allegedly hacked account), we observe the following 
types of tweets:  
 Messages that plainly suggest a hack (e.g., 
“@AllRiseSilver is your twitter account hacked?”) 
 Suggestions to take a specific counter action. Thus, 
users suggest the victims to change their password 
(e.g., “@aam429 I think your account has been 
hacked change your password good luck”) or to 
check applications which were granted permissions 
(e.g., “@brijesh58 Did you DM me any link ? Or is 
your account hacked ? Check apps you have granted 
permission.”) 
 Retweets of the alleged spam; possibly also 
containing a comment on the content of the retweeet  
(e.g. “ Bwahahaha! Is your account got hacked bro? 
RT @owlcity: j0mbl0 h4h4h4 lu k3n4 v12u5 4l4y 
y4? k37ul424n cy4ph4 wkwkwk - -“) 
 Detailed description of the source of the spam attack 
in detail (e.g., “@BeckyBeckyh123 I think your 
account has been hacked, just received a spurious 
DM from you”). 
  Messages referring to the content of the spam (e.g., 
“@jessicalacie I think you’ve been hacked, got a 
dieting DM from your account.”).  
 
As can be seen from these types of initial tweets, peers 
who realize that a user they follow has been allegedly 
hacked, include a different level of detail about the 
alleged hack into their tweet.  
Analogous to the mentions, we also performed an 
explorative study on the responses to the initial tweets 
(as described previously) of the victims of hack attacks. 
We again find that there are different patterns how 
allegedly hacked users react: 
 Some users clearly are victims of misuse and have 
not yet regained control over their account or 
possibly not even noticed that their account was 
hacked (e.g. “Quickly burn off stomach fat while 
dropping 25lbs in a month using 
http://t.co/BWn4JYPYWB”). 
 Others state a direct answer to a suspicion and also 
react to specific measures that the mentioning user 
suggests (e.g. “@Alisha_Salik thanks dude! Will do 
[change password]”) 
 More general answers often respond to possibly 
multiple mentioning users (e.g. “sorry for any rogue 
DMs, my account got hacked”) 
 
As for the replies to the tweets hinting the user that 
his/her account might have been hacked, we observe 
that those answers are either directed at the initial tweet 
it followed or to a more general audience, when the user 
apologizes for the unsolicited tweets and direct 
messages. These findings are in line with those by 
Zangerle et al. [14] who generally analyzed how users 
react once they find that their account was 
compromised.  
The fact that users respond quickly (80% within 24 
hours, 48% within the first 60 minutes) suggests that 
being notified is of great importance to them.  
Generally, we consider Twitter a single 
representative of online social networks and argue that 
Twitter may only serve as a showcase for such an 
approach which may be generalized to other online 
social networks as well. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the behavior and reaction of 
Twitter users whose account has been compromised and 
their peer. We present a method to perform such an 
analysis based on a dataset of tweets about hacked 
accounts collected over the course of two years. Our 
methods allow to perform a reliable reconstruction of 
conversations about a hacked Twitter account. We 
further find that 30% of the accused victims respond to 
the accusations, either confirming a hack or explaining 
the situation. Moreover, we find that 48% of all users 
that actually reply to these allegations, respond within 
the first hour after having received the hinting tweet. 
Similarly, 53% of all users within our dataset make use 
of the first tweet to respond to the allegations after 
having been informed that their account might have 
been hacked.  
Future work includes carrying out a deeper 
qualitative analysis of the conversations revealed by the 
presented extraction methods, gathering a more 
extensive and up-to-date dataset and further 
improvements of the classification methods used. 
Furthermore, we are interested in comparing the 
accuracy and the time passed until a hack can be 
detected to existing quantitative approaches. Another 
interesting topic would be to analyze the content of the 
tweets regarding contained topics or sentiment. 
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